


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## STUDY PROJECT

### MI OFFICER TRAINING IN THE FUTURE: HOW WE CAN MAKE IT BETTER

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WALTER V. WALSH, JR.  
United States Army

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
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MI OFFICER TRAINING IN THE FUTURE:  
HOW WE CAN MAKE IT BETTER

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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## INTRODUCTION

Tomorrow's Army will remain a Total Force trained and ready to fight, serving our Nation at home and abroad -- a strategic force capable of rapid, decisive victory. It will continue to reflect US will and commitment at home and abroad and will be capable of protecting US interests whenever and wherever they are threatened. Although America's Army will decrease in size, it will retain the capabilities that made it successful in Desert Storm and will continue to maintain momentum while accommodating change.<sup>1</sup>

The US Army of Fiscal Year 1995 and beyond will have fewer divisions and a smaller end strength than any time since before the Korean conflict.<sup>2</sup> Training a projected force of less than 450,000 to maintain combat readiness will be the biggest challenge that the US Army will face in the near future. The purpose of this paper is to look at some of the ways that can be utilized with existing resources to provide training that will improve the skills of the Military Intelligence officer at the tactical level (BDE-CORPS). Providing highly effective training to MI officers is not just an MI Corps challenge but a US Army challenge. Thus, this paper will focus on integrating the roles of the unit commander, the US Army Intelligence School (USAICS) and the individual MI officer in developing, supporting and executing the necessary training to make all highly motivated MI officers proactive players and invaluable assets to their units. The observations and recommendations made in this paper are primarily based upon my experience as an intelligence officer in tactical units and my interface with combat arms commanders at the brigade, division and corps levels. All of the

recommendations that I make in this paper can be initiated immediately without major changes to organization, mission or allocation of resources.

#### THE ROLE OF THE UNIT COMMANDER

Commanders at all levels play a vital role in the training and developing of MI officers. All commanders, not just MI commanders, must provide the continual command emphasis to ensure that intelligence training, particularly at the staff level, is an integral part of the unit's training plan.

Intelligence is one of the seven Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) that the commander at any level is responsible to integrate systematically to ensure that all elements of the unit's combat power are directed towards accomplishing the overall mission.<sup>3</sup> Intelligence as a BOS will drive the planning and decision-making process throughout a combat operation. In many cases during training exercises and real world operations commanders have criticized their intelligence officers for not understanding or meeting their specific requirements and not playing a key role in the operation. Many commanders ask, "Why doesn't the intelligence system work?" or "Why doesn't the S-2 know his job?" In some cases the commander is justified in making these comments. In most instances, the intelligence system has not functioned properly, because the commander has not placed sufficient emphasis on the integration of intelligence training at the staff level.

Commanders cannot take for granted that the intelligence system will work. The intelligence system, like every other aspect of combat operations, needs to be exercised -- something that can only be accomplished through training. If a unit never supports the S-2 in exercising the intelligence cycle or in utilizing MI collection assets in training, then the system will not function in combat. Exercising the intelligence system in training allows the commander, S-2 and the rest of the staff to learn the capabilities and limitations of the system and to learn how intelligence supports the planning and targeting processes. The importance of developing this skill is evident during the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) Warfighter Exercise.<sup>4</sup> During this exercise, commanders spent more time at the intelligence map than any other map. Many commanders, during this highly stressful exercise, learn how valuable an effective intelligence system can be to them in their decision making process. If the intelligence system does not get exercised then only the commander can provide the needed emphasis to make it a major training priority.

How can the unit commander ensure that intelligence is integrated into staff training? First, the commander, like the S-2, must be a salesperson in emphasizing that timely and accurate intelligence will drive the staff planning process. Whenever a commander participates in a staff planning exercise, his first question should be, "What is the enemy situation?" This sends a signal to the rest of the staff and subordinate

commanders that he knows how important intelligence is in developing operation plans or orders. Second, the commander must take an active role in discussing the enemy situation with the S-2. He mentors the S-2 in this process. He also allows the S-2 to determine what the commander's priorities and requirements are concerning the enemy. If the commander takes the interest then the rest of his staff will make the effort to learn how the intelligence provided by the S-2 will influence each staff section's estimate and recommendations made to the commander. For example, a G-4 recommending the best main supply route (MSR) for a division to use must take into consideration the type of road surface, the enemy artillery threat, and the unconventional warfare threat along the different road networks before he can make an accurate recommendation. All of this information should come from the G-2.

Third, the commander must participate in staff exercises. This participation provides the S-2 with a good opportunity to learn the commander's intelligence needs in certain specific type operations like an air assault or infiltration. Participation also helps the S-2 learn how the commander likes to conduct business, such as in receiving briefings: Does the commander like informal or informal briefings? What type of format should the S-2 use? One of the biggest problems that S-2s have is in briefing their commander in terms they don't understand. In the MI world we have too many acronyms; we can easily overwhelm commanders with excessive technical data that they do not need.



Commanders are usually not interested in technical terms nor do they want to sort out the meaning of a lot of facts. Commanders participating in staff exercises give the S-2 an opportunity to learn what the commander wants and how he wants it conveyed. This type of interaction will pay great dividends when both commander and S-2 are under intense pressure in combat or even in a BCTP Warfighter Exercise.

The commander can also ensure that intelligence training is emphasized by including the MI slice in all field training exercises. The slice is made up of MI teams that come from the MI Battalion at division or MI Brigade at corps level. The teams consist of POW interrogators, counterintelligence agents, voice intercept/jamming operators and radar/sensor operators.<sup>5</sup> Many units only use the MI slice during major exercises and as a result do not know how to effectively employ or support these assets. In many cases MI assets are never used but are kept in the rear areas. If used they could provide a tremendous amount of combat information. Utilizing the MI teams during all training exercises will enable the commander, S-2 and the rest of the staff to learn the capabilities and limitations of these assets. The MI team can be an effective combat multiplier only if it receives the command emphasis and is allowed to train with the combat unit on a regular basis.

Thus, the commander plays a critical role in determining how intelligence will contribute to the overall combat readiness of his unit. The new US Army FM 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook

on Intelligence, will help all commanders understand the Intelligence BOS and the overall responsibilities of their S-2. The unit commander who understands the value of intelligence and who places the needed command emphasis to make it work will go a long way toward making his unit ready to fight and win in any environment.

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMANDMENTS FOR COMMANDERS

\* To defeat the enemy, you must tell your intelligence officer what you must know and when you must know it.

\* You must tell your operations officer that every plan must be coordinated with the intelligence officer.

\* You must know what intelligence systems are available to support you and what their capabilities are.

\* You and your staff must participate in the IPB process. Do not let your intelligence officer do IPB by himself.

\* You must decide who is responsible for controlling your reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance effort and assign them the assets and mission.<sup>6</sup>

MG William W. Hartzog  
Commander  
1st Infantry Division (Mech)  
Fort Riley

## THE ROLE OF THE US ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER AND SCHOOL

The US Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) provides MI officers with a solid foundation of individual skills and standards with which they can become fully effective members of units.<sup>7</sup> USAICS has been extremely successful in developing and executing challenging training for officers during the last 10 years. Today, the lieutenant graduating from the MI Officers Basic Course is better prepared than ever before to take on the challenges of his first assignment. The MI Officers Advanced Course is properly focused on providing the MI Captain with the doctrine and background that will help him succeed as an S-2 or a company commander. The numerous add-on training modules developed by the school in specific areas such as signals intelligence are invaluable to MI officer development.

What else can USAICS do in the future, with anticipated limited resources to help train the MI officer? First, it is imperative that the school maintain an active communications link with MI officers in the field. US Army roles and missions are changing and MI officers are part of that change when they participate in disaster relief, peacekeeping/peacemaking missions, development of the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) and the integration of the Corp MI Support Element (CMISE). The MI officers in the field participating in these missions and changes can provide valuable feedback to USAICS. The school in turn can verify new doctrine and keep MI officers aware of the newest procedures. Good ideas successfully executed in the field can be

of tremendous value to an MI officer working in another unit in the field or to an MI officer who is getting ready to go back to a field/unit assignment.

One of the best ways for USAICS to maintain effective communications with the field is to monitor the success of intelligence as a BOS in the major training exercises that occur in the US Army throughout the year. In the future the US Army will continue to focus its training on the Combat Training Center Program (CTCP). The CTCP consists of the National Training Center (NTC), Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP).<sup>8</sup> All of these centers provide tough, demanding training that stretches both individuals and units to their limits. Today, a unit's participation in one of these rotations is usually the training highlight of the year. The intelligence BOS receives a tremendous workout and evaluation during any of these exercises. If the intelligence system fails it usually results in the unit struggling to survive during the exercise. For the S-2, this type of exercise is extremely challenging for a number of reasons. First, the commander and staff learn (some for the first time) that intelligence drives the operation, and thus the S-2 becomes the focal point for the tactical operations center. Second, it is probably the first time that the S-2 will have all the intelligence collection assets from the MI Team to work with in managing the intelligence system. In many cases, with a rapidly changing tactical situation and the numerous

intelligence assets to manage, the S-2 can easily become overwhelmed with information, get behind and never recover. USAICS has the assets to play a major role in preparing the S-2 to function effectively in these highly stressful situations. The school has a training tool known as the G-2 workstation. This computer-based war game utilizes real world threat scenarios to train MI officers at the brigade-corps levels in all aspects of intelligence. In the past, division G-2s have brought their entire staff, the G-3, DIVARTY S-2, and a number of brigade and battalion S-2s to conduct a week of intelligence training. Not only is it a good team building opportunity but it also allows the G-2 to develop different aspects of his system in a nonthreatening environment. In this environment the G-2 can control the pace of the exercise and can change the scenario at any time to emphasize teaching points.

What can USAICS do to make the G-2 workstation a more valuable tool to MI officers in the field? First, USAICS should develop scenarios and standards for the G-2 workstations that are used in the Combat Training Center Program. Second, the school should have at least one MI major and four MI captains assigned to the G-2 workstation. These officers will coordinate directly with each of the training centers to obtain the threat scenarios and the intelligence requirements. The officers would then work to develop the same type scenarios and standards for the G-2 workstation. The G-2 workstation would then be made available for G-2s to bring in their staff and subordinate S-2s to spend a

week training and building their team by utilizing a threat scenario very similar to the one they will see in a BCTP or JRTC rotation. Normally G-2s could schedule the week long training at the G-2 workstation approximately 60 days prior to participating in the actual CTCP. The school, in coordination with the participating G-2, can invite another G-2 and selected members of his staff to participate as observers. The school would invite the G-2 who is scheduled to participate in a BCTP 4-6 months out. This affords the participating G-2 an opportunity to have an outside expert assist him in identifying strengths and weaknesses in a nonthreatening environment. It also allows the G-2 and his staff who are acting as observers to see how another unit manages a very similar type intelligence system. The observer G-2 can also use this week to begin long range planning on how he will use the G-2 workstation to prepare his staff for a BCTP. USAICS could provide senior MI officers who could receive briefings or provide input during the daily after action reviews conducted at the G-2 workstation.

Funding to support the TDY costs will continue to come from the Readiness Training Funds. These funds, allocated by the Intelligence and Security Command to tactical units each year, are used specifically for intelligence training. If adequate funds are not available and the G-2 can only bring a limited number of his staff, then USAICS could use this opportunity to use officers in the basic and advanced courses to augment the staff. This practice would possibly allow officer students the

opportunity to work in jobs that they may have in their next assignment. The experience would also help validate what they learned in their respective courses.

The benefits gained from using the G-2 workstation as a training tool are extremely valuable to both the participating units and the school. The biggest advantage to the G-2 is that it provides him an opportunity to focus solely on developing all aspects of his intelligence system in a nonthreatening environment. Rarely does a G-2 have the opportunity at his home station to focus solely on intelligence training or, during a normal exercise, to be able to identify a weakness, stop the exercise, teach, make adjustments and then continue. The school sends a very positive message to the rest of the US Army: that the school will do everything possible to help ensure the development and success of MI officers in the field. The resources are currently available at USAICS and it will only take continual command emphasis to make the G-2 workstation a major success.

"Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort."<sup>9</sup> General George H. Decker, USA

One of the biggest challenges that the Intelligence school faces is to develop doctrine and train officers to provide intelligence support to new conventional Army missions. The two missions that are receiving a lot of emphasis today are support



to antidrug operations and participation in peacekeeping/peacemaking operations.

The US Army during the last decade has increased its support to Federal agencies in conducting antidrug operations. Intelligence has always played a key role in planning and executing antidrug operations. In many cases when battalion size units from the US Army are tasked to support antidrug operations, the S-2 is not prepared or trained to plan, integrate and supervise the unit's intelligence system to support the operation. Normally, the S-2 receives an initial threat brief from a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) representative, then briefs his unit and spends the remainder of his time monitoring reports -- if he receives any. The S-2 basically remains in a reactive mode throughout the exercise.

The Intelligence school can take a number of actions to help train the S-2. First, it can maintain a current drug threat data base in conjunction with the DEA or be able to link the S-2 with the data base maintained by Federal drug agencies. Second, officers attending courses at the school should receive training on providing intelligence support to antidrug operations at the battalion/brigade task force level. Third, the school should debrief S-2s from recent antidrug operations to learn more about the threat and the role the S-2 played. The school can then pass this information on to its students or any other S-2 who is preparing to participate in antidrug operations. Utilizing the threat data base and the current information, the school needs to

develop a pamphlet or manual that discusses the role of the S-2 in conducting antidrug operations. This reference can be an effective starting point for an S-2 who has not had any training in intelligence support to antidrug operations. Included in this reference should be a section on the legal aspects of using active duty military to conduct anti-drug operations. Also included in this reference should be an S-2 checklist to assist the S-2 in preparing and managing his intelligence system during the actual operation. It appears that the US Army's support to the drug war will increase in the future. USAICS must continue to develop the doctrine, conduct the training and provide the reference materials to support the S-2 in the field.

The second area that USAICS needs to develop new doctrine for the S-2 is in peacekeeping/peacemaking operations. The credibility of the United Nations since Desert Storm had increased and many nations are seeking the assistance of the UN to resolve regional or internal conflicts. The US military will play actively in these joint/coalition task forces; again, intelligence will play a key role throughout the operation. USAICS must work to develop the doctrine or procedures that will help S-2s prepare for such operations in an anticipated short preparation period. What essentially is needed is a reference that identifies the responsibilities of the S-2 during the pre-deployment, deployment, operational and redeployment phases. Also included in the manual should be a list of intelligence agencies that can provide support (Defense Mapping Agency, DIA,

etc.) and the procedures to request this support. USAICS can obtain this information through interviews with MI officers who have participated in peacemaking operations, such as with the 10th Infantry Division in Somalia. Once the school has developed and distributed the manual it should then integrate a section on intelligence support to peacekeeping/peacemaking operations in its MI basic and advanced courses.

The US Army Intelligence Center and School in the future must remain the focal point for providing MI officers with up-to-date doctrine, challenging training and the support to provide timely and accurate intelligence to commanders in the field. Doing so will be a tremendous challenge for USAICS especially with an anticipated reduction in personnel and budget resources. USAICS can meet all of these challenges through active coordination with the field and by employing its limited resources to those battle focused tasks that will help the MI Corps maintain its credibility with commanders at every level in the US Army.

#### THE ROLE OF THE MI OFFICER

"The American soldier expects his sergeant to be able to teach him how to do his job. And he expects even more from his officers."<sup>10</sup> General Omar N. Bradley

The MI officer in the future will face numerous challenges and be expected to do more with less -- better and faster than in the past. In some cases the challenges of the future will

overwhelm MI officers if they do not keep in mind the fact that they have opportunities to learn every day and must take advantage of them. Though the US Army Intelligence Center and School will continue to provide the basics of intelligence to MI officers it will be incumbent upon each officer to take the initiative to develop the numerous skills required to continue to make intelligence a combat multiplier. How often and how much an MI officer learns will depend upon his motivation, determination and attitude. We can learn every day in our jobs, whether we have been in the US Army a week, year or 20 years; there is always some aspect of our job that we can learn about and improve. There is also nothing in the intelligence arena that is so complex that it can't be learned and applied by an individual with average intelligence. MI officers who are not willing to learn and develop will stagnate very rapidly and be left behind. The intelligence business is always evolving. The officer who understands this and continues to learn and apply new doctrine and techniques will make the biggest impact in the US Army in the future.

What are some of the areas that MI officers should concentrate on in order to develop professionally? First, the MI officer must learn, understand and be able to apply US Army doctrine -- whether it be warfighting, low intensity conflict, peacemaking or any other new doctrine that is developed. Knowing US Army doctrine will enable MI officers to focus, manage and anticipate the requirements of the tactical commander. Being

familiar with US Army doctrine is not enough because the MI officer will steer the intelligence system towards producing general or unspecific data. Commanders demand specific intelligence, especially when time is critical and resources are limited. It is only through a thorough understanding of the tenets of AirLand Battle or Low Intensity Conflict that an S-2 can make a difference at the level he is working at. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., in The Army and Vietnam, clearly shows how important it is to know US Army doctrine at the different levels of war:

The South Vietnamese found US Army MI officers trying to combat the insurgency by following the principles they had been taught in FM 30-5 (Combat Intelligence), a manual geared to mid or high intensity conflict against an adversary such as the Soviet Union in the European environment.<sup>11</sup>

One of the biggest challenges in learning warfighting doctrine is understanding and being able to integrate intelligence into the targeting process. At the brigade and division level identifying targets is one of the most important responsibilities of the S-2. MI officers must understand the DECIDE-DETECT-DELIVER process and how Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) contributes to the target development process.<sup>12</sup> In the future, commanders will use every available means to destroy, disrupt or delay enemy capabilities in order to "prep" the battlefield. The S-2 at every level can play a significant role in the targeting cell if he understands the process, anticipates the requirements, and recommends high value

targets that will be engaged and thus support the commander's objective.

The second area that the MI officer needs to learn is how to conduct intelligence operations in joint and coalition environments. In the future, largely as a result of the anticipated reduction of US military forces and the success of coalition warfare during Desert Storm, most US military operations will be joint and occur in a coalition environment. These operations are multidimensional, and more complex, and require mutual sharing of assets in order to be successful. Intelligence will continue to be the foundation on which the operational effort is built.<sup>13</sup> MI officers must learn how to use all the available intelligence collection assets in order to build a responsive intelligence system. The key is to learn how to manage an intelligence system at the Joint Task Force level first, then learn how to function in a coalition environment. One of the best ways to learn is by reading the intelligence after action reports for such operations as Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Shield/Storm. These after action reviews provide many insights on building, managing and modifying intelligence systems in combat to meet the requirements of the commander. The key is to begin learning the joint doctrine now so that you know and understand the procedures and challenges for operating in a joint environment. In most cases, once you have been designated to be part of a JTF, you will be too busy to stop and learn how to function in a JTF or coalition environment.

Collection Management (CM) is the focus for successfully executing intelligence operations at all levels because the effective use of this process determines the S-2's ability to answer the commander's requirements. If the CM system is not properly focused the intelligence system will fail. The biggest area of the overall intelligence system needing the most emphasis in developing MI officers at all levels is collection management. CM is hard to develop and manage at brigade, division or corps level. First, the system is dynamic: requirements are always changing as the enemy situation changes. Second, many MI officers do not know the capabilities and limitations of the collection assets within their CM system. We tend to develop a great CM system in the initial planning stage; but, as soon as the war begins and the enemy situation changes, we have difficulty modifying the system. As a result, in rapidly changing tactical situations, the CM system is often never properly refocused. In these cases, the S-2 can't answer the commander's requirements. MI officers must take the time to learn the basics of collection management -- which means studying Field Manual 34-2 in great detail.<sup>14</sup> The MI officer must then learn the capabilities/limitations of the MI assets that will provide intelligence to him, whether at his level or from a higher headquarters. He must learn Intelligence Electronic Warfare (IEW) synchronization and the role it plays in collection management. He must then practice developing an IEW synchronization plan. The key is to learn the doctrine, use the

tools available (IEW Synchronization) and practice developing and modifying the CM system during every training exercise. The collection systems projected for the future will provide a tremendous amount of data, but will this data have the answers that will assist the commander in his decision making process? It is only through effective collection management that MI officers can ensure that the intelligence operation is properly focused to meet the ever-changing requirements of the tactical commander.

"Leadership is intangible, and therefore no weapon ever designed can replace it."<sup>15</sup> General Omar N. Bradley

The last area that MI officers should learn and integrate into all aspects of their work is leadership. Leadership is what makes the intelligence system function properly, under all types of conditions, 24 hours a day. Good leadership in intelligence makes the winning difference in every unit or staff section. A key contribution that MI officers can make to any unit, staff or organization is to use effective leadership to build a cohesive, highly motivated MI team that consistently makes the intelligence system work. The soldiers, noncommissioned officers and warrant officers who make up the MI Corps today (and in the future) are professionals in every aspect of their jobs and only want the opportunity to excel. The tougher the challenge, the better their performance. It is the MI officer's responsibility to build these teams through effective leadership. In the MI Corps



we need to place more emphasis on developing officers leadership ability.

How can we develop good leadership in all our MI officers? First, we must recognize that developing good leadership traits is a learning process that is ongoing throughout an officer's career. Second, we must emphasize to all MI officers that effective leadership will motivate subordinates to be successful in every aspect of their work. Third, we must instill in all MI officers the importance of concentrating on developing as a leader as they progress through their individual careers. Promotions bring on increased responsibility to officers but do not automatically develop the individual's officer's leadership ability. It must be developed every day through experience, reading about leadership, positive mentoring, and approaching every aspect of the job from a leadership perspective. MI officers must work throughout their career to learn the technical aspects of the intelligence process but they also must keep developing their leadership potential. Effective leadership helps build strong cohesive teams made up of highly motivated individuals that thrive on new challenges every day in their work. Good leadership creates an atmosphere where individuals work in a Win/Win situation and are not threatened by zero defects. It takes a lot of hard work, coordination and sacrifice on the part of the MI officer to build an organization, unit or staff section on the principles of effective leadership. Can this be accomplished or is it too much to expect from officers

involved in intelligence operations? It can be done and there are many examples of MI units and staffs that have successfully built this type of environment. They can easily be identified because these units and staffs are always coming up with innovative new ideas or being recognized for doing a great job on a BCTP, JRTC rotations or for winning a major award like the NSA Director's Trophy. With a few exceptions, MI officers in the future will make a bigger contribution to the US Army and the MI Corps through effective leadership than in any other area.

The MI officer in the future must play a larger role in his own professional development. This will not be an easy task as the intelligence arena is always changing with new technology, collection systems and doctrine affecting the way we develop and manage the intelligence system. It will take only highly motivated MI officers to meet this challenge and successfully lead the MI Corps into the 21st Century.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### COMMANDERS:

- \* Learn and use US Army FM 34-8.
- \* Provide the "command emphasis" to make intelligence an integral part of every operation or training exercise.
- \* Mentor the S-2.
- \* Include the MI slice in all unit level training.
- \* Make your intelligence system a combat multiplier.

### The US Army Intelligence Center and School

- \* Maintain an active communications link with MI officers in the field.

- \* Develop the scenarios and standards for the G-2 Workstation based on the Combat Training Center Program.

- \* Develop and rapidly disseminate doctrine to support new US Army missions. (Antidrug/Peacekeeping)

### All MI Officers:

- \* Learn and be able to apply all aspects of US Army warfighting doctrine.

- \* Learn how to establish and direct intelligence operations in joint and coalition environments.

- \* Develop a thorough understanding of how collection management works in the intelligence system.

- \* Learn and work to become an effective leader in all jobs throughout your career.

It is only through the integrated efforts of the unit commander, USAICS and the individual MI officer that can ensure MI officer training in the future will remain a "battle focused" task throughout the US Army.

## ENDNOTES

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6. Ibid., Insert.
7. Department of the Army, Army Command, Leadership and Management: Theory and Practice, US Army War College (Carlisle Barracks: US Department of the Army, 18 September 1992), 21-11.
8. Ibid., 21-27.
9. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, Joint Pub 1 (Washington: The Joint Staff, 11 November 1991), 5.
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12. Department of the Army, Intelligence Analysis, Field Manual 34-3 (Washington: US Department of the Army, 15 March 1990), 7-3 to 7-7.
13. Defense Intelligence Agency, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. Joint Pub 2-0 (Test Pub) (Washington: The Joint Staff, 30 June 1991), II-2.

14. Department of the Army, Collective Management, Field Manual 34-2 (Washington: US Department of the Army, 20 October 1990), 3-1 to 3-16.

15. Department of the Army, Military Leadership, Field Manual 22-100 (Washington: US Department of the Army, July 1990), 3.

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